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Abstract
We investigate the idea that different interpretations of quantum
mechanics can be seen as restrictions of the consistent (or decoherent)
histories quantum mechanics of closed systems to particular classes of
histories, together with the approximations and descriptions of these
histories that the restrictions permit.
1 Introduction
A list of some thirteen different interpretations of quantum mechanics was
discussed at the concluding session of this conference1 . The very length
of this list invites the questions: What are the relationships between these
interpretations?; To what uses may they be put?; and Is it possible to ob-
jectively settle on one?. This brief article offers some personal reflections on
these questions.
The defining thread connecting interpretations of quantum theory is their
agreement on the probabilities for the outcomes of measurements, at least
to an excellent approximation. Some formulations may provide probabilities
for further kinds of alternatives such as the position of the Moon when it is
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not receiving attention from observers, or the values of density fluctuations
in the very early universe when there were no observers around. However, a
formulation that does not reproduce the standard textbook answers for the
probabilities of measurements it is not an interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics. Rather, it is a different theory. Such alternatives to quantum theory are
of great interest but not the subject of this essay.
The idea explored here is that a number of different interpretations of
quantum mechanics can be connected through the consistent (or decoherent)
quantum mechanics of a closed system. Specifically, a number of interpre-
tations can be seen as restrictions of consistent histories quantum theory to
particular kinds of sets of alternative histories2 together with the approxima-
tions and special descriptions of the sets that these restrictions permit. This
essay examines three cases where this connection can be made and gives brief
discussions of the utility of the restrictions involved.
2 The Quantum Mechanics of Closed Sys-
tems
We begin with a very brief review of the quantum mechanics of a closed
system, most generally the universe as a whole3. To simplify the discussion we
neglect quantum gravity and assume a fixed background spacetime geometry.
The familiar apparatus of Hilbert space, states, and operators may then be
employed to formulate the quantum mechanics of the closed system4. As
a simple model, we can think of a large, isolated box of N non-relativistic
particles. Dynamics can be specified in terms of particle positions ~xi and
momenta ~pi by a Hamiltonian
H =
N∑
i=1
~p2i
2mi
+ V (~xi). (2.1)
Both observers and observed, if any, are contained inside. This is evidently
not the most general description of a closed system but it will suffice to
2“Frameworks” in the terminology of Griffiths.
3For details see the classic expositions in [1, 2, 3].
4For the generalizations that may be otherwise required, see [4]. We view the quantum
mechanics of closed systems as an extension and completion of the Everett formulation
and therefore do not count that as a separate interpretation.
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illustrate some of the connections between interpretations that we describe
later.
We take the closed system to be described by a quantum state |Ψ〉. The
most general objective of quantum theory is the prediction from H and |Ψ〉
of the probabilities of the individual members of a set of coarse-grained al-
ternative histories of the closed system. A history is described by giving
a sequence of alternatives (α1, · · ·αn) at a series of times t1, · · · , tn. Al-
ternatives at a moment of time tk are represented by an exhaustive set of
orthogonal, Heisenberg picture, projection operators {P kαk(tk)} and a history
of alternatives is represented by the corresponding chain of projections called
a class operator
Cα = P
k
αn(tn) · · ·P
1
α1
(t1). (2.2)
(On the left side of (2.2) we have abbreviated the whole chain (α1, · · · , αn)
by a single index α). For example, if we are interested in a history of the
Earth moving around the Sun, the P ’s might be projections onto exclusive
ranges of the center of mass position of the Earth at a sequence of times.
This set of histories is coarse-grained because alternatives are not specified
at every time but only at some times, because the center of mass position
is not specified exactly but only in certain ranges, and because not every
variable describing the universe is specified but only the center of mass of
the Earth.
The class operators Cα defined in (2.2) permit the construction of branch
state vectors
|Ψα〉 = Cα|Ψ〉 (2.3)
for each history in the coarse-grained set. A set of histories decoheres when
there is negligible mutual interference between all the branch state vectors:
〈Ψα|Ψα′〉 ≈ 0, α 6= α
′. (2.4)
The joint probability pα for all the events in a history α is
pα = ‖ |Ψα〉 ‖
2 = ‖Cα|Ψ〉‖
2 (2.5)
when the set of histories decoheres. Decoherence ensures the validity of the
probability sum rules which are among the defining properties of probability.
The above discussion is brief, certainly oversimplified in some respects,
but sufficient we hope for understanding the remarks which follow. The key
point for the ensuing discussion is the following: Decoherent histories quan-
tum mechanics predicts probabilities for many different sets of alternative
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histories which are complimentary in the following sense: Each set is part of
a complete quantum description of the system, but there is no fine-grained
decoherent set histories of which all the decoherent sets are coarse-grainings.
A set of histories coarse-grained by the Earth’s center of mass momentum is
an example of a set which (if decoherent) would be complementary to the
set coarse-grained by the Earth’s center of mass position.
Given H and |Ψ〉, it is in principle possible to calculate all decoherent
sets. Among these is the quasiclassical realm of everyday experience, coarse-
grained by the variables of classical physics, and exhibiting classical patterns
correlation in time summarized approximately by classical equations of mo-
tion. As human observers we focus almost entirely on coarse-grainings of
this quasiclassical realm. However, quantum theory does not distinguish the
quasiclassical realm from other decoherent sets except by properties such as
its classicality.
The picture of quantum reality which emerges from the quantum me-
chanics of closed systems is very different from the reality of classical physics
involving, as it does, many complementary descriptions of the universe that
are mutually incompatible. Restricting the allowed sets of histories by some
principle5 typically yields a description of reality that is closer in character
to the familiar classical one. We will see that in the cases to be discussed.
3 Three Case Studies
This section considers the idea offered in the Introduction for three different
interpretations of quantum theory.
3.1 Copenhagen Quantum Mechanics
The Copenhagen quantum mechanics found in most textbooks is concerned
with the probabilities of histories of the outcomes of measurements carried
out by observers. The subsystem being observed is described by a Hilbert
space Hs. Dynamics is specified by a Hamiltonian h acting on Hs when the
subsystem is isolated. Initially the subsystem is assumed to be a state |ψ〉 in
Hs. The outcomes of a measurement carried out at time tk can be described
by a set of orthogonal, Heisenberg picture, projection operators {skαk(tk)},
αk = 1, 2, · · · analogous to the P ’s described in Section II. The probabilities
5A set selection principle in terminology of Dowker and Kent [5].
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for a history of ideal measurements (ones that disturb the subsystem as little
as possible) at times t1, · · · , tn are given by the analog of (2.5).
pα =
∥∥snαn(tn) · · · s1α1(t1)|ψ〉
∥∥2 . (3.1)
Consistency is not an issue for these probabilities. Probabilities for a coarser-
grained history need not be the sum of the probabilities of finer-grained his-
tories consistent with it. Finer and coarser grained measurements correspond
to different interactions of the subsystem with an external apparatus. Sets
of histories describing alternative measurements do not have to decohere.
Copenhagen quantum mechanics is an approximation to the quantum
mechanics of closed systems that is appropriate for histories of measurement
situations when the decoherence of alternatives that register the outcomes
of the measurements can be idealized as exact. We sketch only the essential
features of a demonstration which are essentially the same as many measure-
ment models. For details see, e.g. [6], Section II.10.
We consider a closed system with a Hilbert space Hs ⊗ Hr where Hs
is the Hilbert space of the measured subsystem and the Hr is the Hilbert
space of the rest of the universe including any measuring apparatus and
observers. We assume an initial state of the form |Ψ〉 = |ψ〉 ⊗ |Φr〉 and
consider a sequence of measurements at a series of times t1, · · · , tn. Measured
alternatives of the subsystem are described by projection operators whose
Schro¨dinger picture representatives have the form Skαk = s
k
αk
⊗Ir. In a typical
measurement situation, an alternative such as Skαk becomes correlated with
an alternative of the apparatus and in particular with persistent records
of the measurements. The orthogonality and persistence of these records
guarantees the decoherence of the histories of measured outcomes. If the
usual assumption is made that the measurement interaction disturbs the
subsystem as little as possible (ideal measurement), then
pα =
∥∥Snαn(t) · · ·S1α1(t1)|Ψ〉
∥∥2
H
≈
∥∥snαn(tn) · · · s1α1(t1)|ψ〉
∥∥2
Hr
. (3.2)
Thus Copenhagen quantum mechanics is recovered as a restriction of, and
approximation to, the quantum mechanics of closed systems. The second
equality in (3.2) is not exact but true to an excellent approximation in real-
istic measurement situations — typically far beyond the accuracy which the
probabilities can be checked or the physical situation modeled.
The utility of the approximate quantum mechanics of measured subsys-
tems is evident. It is a truly excellent approximation for every laboratory
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experiment which has tested the principles of quantum theory. Further, the
calculations of the approximate Copenhagen probabilities utilizing just the
Hilbert space of the measured subsystem will generally be vastly simpler
than in the Hilbert space of the universe. These advantages, however, should
not obscure the utility of embedding the Copenhagen quantum mechanics
in the more general quantum mechanics of closed systems for understanding
measurements (as above) and calculating just how good an approximation it
is.
3.2 Bohm Theory
To summarize the features of Bohm theory [7] that are relevant to the present
discussion, it is convenient to restrict attention to the closed system consisting
of N , non-relativistic particles in a box discussed in Section II. An initial
wave function Ψ(~x1, · · ·~xN , 0) is given. The particles in the box move on
trajectories ~xi(t) that obey two deterministic equations. The first is the
Schro¨dinger equation for Ψ:
ih¯
∂Ψ
∂t
= HΨ. (3.3)
Then, writing Ψ = R exp(iS) with R and S real, the second equation is the
deterministic equation for the ~xi(t)
mi
d~xi
dt
= ~∇~xiS (~x1, · · · , ~xN). (3.4)
The initial wave function is the initial condition for (3.3). The theory be-
comes a statistical theory with the assumption that the initial values of the
~xi are distributed according to the probability density on configuration space
℘ (~x1, · · · , ~xN , 0) = |Ψ (~x1, · · · , ~xN , 0)|
2
, at the initial time 0. (3.5)
Once this initial probability distribution is fixed, the probability of any later
alternatives is fixed by the deterministic equation (3.4).
A coarse-grained Bohmian history α ≡ (αn, · · · , α1) is defined by a se-
quence of ranges {∆kαk} of the ~xi at a series of times t1, · · · tn and consists of
the set of Bohmian trajectories ~xi(t) that cross those ranges at the specified
times.
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The predictions of Bohm theory and the quantum mechanics of closed
systems can be compared for sets of alternative histories coarse-grained by
ranges of the position ~xi at different times as above. Generally different
probabilities are predicted for the same set of histories [8]. This difference
arises as follows: Bohm histories are deterministic. That means that the
probability that the particles traverse a series of regions of configuration space
at a sequence of times is the same as the probability of the initial values of
~xi that evolve to those trajectories under the equations of motion (3.3) and
(3.4). The probability of a Bohm trajectory can therefore be represented as
p(BM)α = ‖Bα|Ψ〉‖
2 (3.6)
where Bα is a projection onto the appropriate initial conditions.
The probabilities of the same set of histories would be calculated in de-
coherent histories quantum theory from [cf. (2.5)]
p(DH)α = ‖Cα|Ψ〉‖
2 (3.7)
provided the set is decoherent. Here the Cα are chains of projections like
(2.2) It is a simple observation is that a chain of projections like (2.2) is not
generally a projection and that therefore p
(BM)
α will not agree generally with
p
(DH)
α . (See [8] for examples and further discussion.)
Another way of seeing the difference is to note that in Bohm theory
the wave function always evolves by the Schro¨dinger equation — unitary
evolution. But the action of a chain of projections Cα on the initial state can
be described as unitary evolution interrupted by the action of the projections
(reduction).
Only in the case of histories with alternatives at a single time are the
predictions of Bohm theory and the quantum mechanics of closed systems
guaranteed to agree. Then the Cα are projections. But this is an important
case because it leads to the conclusion that Bohm theory and the quantum
mechanics of closed systems agree on the probabilities of the outcome of
measurements.
One characteristic of a measurement situation which seems generally
agreed upon is that the results of a measurement are recorded — at least
for a time. A history Cα of measurement outcomes is recorded in a set of
alternatives {Rα} at a time later than the last alternative in Cα if the values
of the Rα are correlated with the outcomes of the measurements described by
the Cα. The Rα’s are projections even if the Cα’s are not. Bohm theory and
7
the quantum theory of closed systems will therefore agree on the probabilities
of these records.
Bohm theory can therefore be seen as a restriction of the quantum theory
of closed systems to alternatives describing the records of measurements (in
the ~x’s) together with the description of these outcomes in terms of deter-
ministic trajectories obeying (3.3) and (3.4). An advantage of Bohm theory
(that is, of this restriction) that we believe would be claimed by its propo-
nents is the clear specification of one set of histories (of the ~x’s) as preferred
over others. A potential disadvantage is that these histories, although de-
terministic, may not be classical even in situations where the correlations of
classical physics in time are predicted with high probability by the quantum
mechanics of closed systems [9]. Thus, for example, even when a classi-
cal past is retrodicted from present records from the quantum mechanics of
closed systems, Bohm theory may predict a non-classical one depending on
the nature of the initial condition [8].
3.3 Sum-Over-Histories
The starting point for a sum-over-histories formulation of quantum mechan-
ics is the specification of one set of fine-grained histories. For the model
universe of non-relativistic particles in a box, these are the particle paths
~xi(t), i = 1, · · · , N . The allowed coarse-grainings are partitions of this set of
fine-grained histories into an exhaustive set of exclusive classes. For example,
the paths could be partitioned by how they traverse a set of regions of con-
figuration space {∆αk}, αk = 1, 2, · · · at sequence of times tk, k = 1, · · · , n.
The class operators Cα are specified by giving their matrix elements as sums
over the fine-grained paths in the coarse-grained class labeled by α. Denoting
a point in the 3N -dimensional configuration space by x, this sum is
〈x′′|Cα|x
′〉 =
∫
α
δx eiS[x(t)]/h¯. (3.8)
Here, S[x(t)] is the action functional and the sum is over all fine-grained
histories in the class labeled by α. For instance, in the partition by sequences
of sets of regions at a series of times, a coarse-grained history α is labeled
by the regions (α1, · · · , αn) crossed at the sequence of times and the sum in
(3.8) defining the class operator is over paths that cross these regions. The
construction of probabilities is then as described in Section II.
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Sum-over-histories quantum theory is evidently a restriction of the quan-
tum mechanics of closed systems described in Section II. All the possible sets
of projection operators that might occur in the construction of a set of alter-
native histories like (2.1) are restricted to projections on ranges of position.
The predictions of the restricted sets agree because of identities that express
sums-over-histories in terms of operators. For instance,
∫
[x′′,∆n,··· ,∆1,x′]
dx eiS[x(t)]/h¯ =
〈
x′′
∣∣P n∆n(tn) · · ·P 1∆1(t1)
∣∣ x′〉 (3.9)
where the sum on the left hand side is over all paths that start at x′ pass
through the regions (∆1, · · · ,∆n) at times t1, · · · , tn and end at x
′ [10].
The sum-over-histories formulation of quantum theory is not usually dis-
cussed as a different interpretation of quantum mechanics. But it can be
[11, 12] because, like Bohm theory, it specifies a fundamental set of variables.
In effect, it posits a set selection principle. To the extent that the quasiclas-
sical realm in which we operate as human observers can be described as a
coarse graining of configuration space [13] no predictive power is lost in mak-
ing this restriction. However, the restriction is not so strong as to narrow
the range of available sets just to the quasiclassical realm.
There is some loss in convenience with a sum-over-histories formulation
because quantities like the momentum of a particle must be described in
spacetime terms — by time of flight for example [11]. But there is also
potential gain. A sum-over-histories restriction provides a head start in the
characterization of classicality and the explanation of its origin (see e.g. [14]).
A sum-over-histories formulation of quantum mechanics is the natural frame-
work for investigating generalizations of quantum mechanics that are neces-
sary to describe spacetime alternatives extended over time (e.g. [15]) and
those which may be needed for a quantum theory of gravity [16, 4].
4 Is There One Interpretation of Quantum
Mechanics?
It would be interesting to investigate how many different interpretations of
quantum theory can be seen as restrictions of the quantum mechanics of
closed systems together with the approximations and particular descriptions
of histories that these restrictions permit. That would be at least one way of
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connecting different interpretations and a common basis for discussing their
assumptions, advantages, motivations, and limitations.
It would be equally interesting to identify interpretations of quantum
mechanics which cannot be viewed as restrictions of the quantum mechanics
of closed systems for some fundamental reason. (And not simply because
they lack the coherence to decide.) Consistent histories quantum mechanics
is logically consistent, consistent with experiment as far as is known, con-
sistent with textbook predictions for measurements, and applicable to the
most general physical systems. However, it may not be the only theory with
these properties. Investigations of interpretations that do not fit within its
umbrella framework may lead in different directions.
Can we distinguish between the different interpretations that are restric-
tions of the quantum mechanics of closed systems? Not by experiment or
observations. By assumption the different interpretations agree on the pre-
dictions for measurement to excellent approximations. It seems unlikely to
this author that we can settle on one interpretation by argument and dis-
cussion. (There is some empirical evidence for this conclusion.) There are
too many individually held opinions on the objectives to be met by the re-
strictions. But neither does there seem to be a compelling need to settle
among interpretations that are restrictions of a common quantum mechanics
of closed systems
We may be able to distinguish interpretations by their utility and/or
their promise as starting points for generalizations or alternatives to quan-
tum theory. For instance, Copenhagen quantum mechanics is inadequate
for cosmology. In cosmology there is no fundamental division of the closed
system into two parts, one of which measures the other. Measurements and
observers cannot be fundamental in a theory that seeks to describe the early
universe where neither existed. In a quantum world there are generally no
variables that behave classically in all circumstances. As another example,
sum-over-histories quantum theory may be a productive route to generalizing
usual quantum theory to incorporate the dynamical spacetime geometry of
quantum gravity [4].
Many years ago, when an instructor at Princeton, I discussed my first
effort in understanding quantum mechanics [17] with Eugene Wigner. At the
conclusion of the discussion I asked him whether I should publish my results.
Wigner explained that there were some subjects — and the interpretation
of quantum mechanics was one of these — that one couldn’t learn about by
reading books or attending lectures. One just had to work through them
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by oneself. And usually, if people took the trouble to do this and reached
a conclusion, they published a paper. “So”, he said, “why shouldn’t you?”
Maybe that is another reason there are so many interpretations of quantum
theory.
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